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Abstract
We consider the sequential decision problem known as regret minimization, or more precisely its generalization to
the vectorial or multi-criteria setup called Blackwell approachability. We assume that Nature, the decision maker,
or both, might have some quitting (or terminating) actions so that the stream of payoffs is constant whenever they
are chosen. We call those environments “quitting games”.
We characterize convex target sets C that are Blackwell approachable, in the sense that the decision maker
has a policy ensuring that the expected average vector payoff converges to C at some given horizon known in
advance. Moreover, we also compare these results to the cases where the horizon is not known and show that,
unlike in standard online learning literature, the necessary or sufficient conditions for the anytime version of this
problem are drastically different than those for the fixed horizon.
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Quitting games We consider the setting where both the decision maker and Nature have a finite set of actions,
denoted respectively by I = I ∪ I? and J = J ∪ J ?. The actions in I and J are called non-quitting, and the
actions in I? and J ? are called quitting. To each pair of actions (i, j) ∈ I × J is associated a payoff vector
g(i, j) ∈ Rd.
The game between the decision maker and Nature is played sequentially and at stage t ∈ N, they choose the
actions it and jt simultaneously. If only non-quitting actions have been played before stage t, i.e. it′ ∈ I and
jt′ ∈ J for every t′ < t, then the decision maker is free to choose any action in I and Nature is free to choose
any action in J. However, if a quitting action was played by either player at a stage prior to stage t, i.e. it′ ∈ I?
or jt′ ∈ J ? for some t′ < t, then it = it−1 and jt = jt−1.
We denote by ∆(E) the set of probability measures over a set E and byM(E) the set of positive measures.
As it is usual, the payoff mapping g is extended multi-linearly to ∆(I) and ∆(J) by g(x,y) =
∑
i,j xiyjg(i, j)
and, more generally, to the set of measuresM(I) andM(J). We also introduce the probability of absorption and
the expected absorption payoff, defined respectively by p?(α, β) =
∑
(i,j)∈(I?×J)∪(I×J ?) αiβj and g
?(α, β) =∑
(i,j)∈(I?×J)∪(I×J ?) αiβjg(i, j)
Given a closed and convex set C ⊂ Rd and a final horizon T , the objective of the decision maker is to ensure
with a strategy σ that the expected average payoff Eσ,τ 1T
∑T
t=1 g(it, jt) is as close to C as possible. The target
set C is called approachable if the distance at stage T converges to 0 as T increases. In this general case, our
main results are
SUFFICIENCY: If the following Condition (1) is satisfied, then C is approachable by the decision maker.
max
y∈∆(J)
min
x∈∆(I)
inf
α∈M(I)
sup
β∈M(J)
dC
(g(x,y) + g?(α,y) + g?(x, β)
1 + p?(α,y) + p?(x, β)
)
= 0 (1)
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NECESSITY: If C is approachable by the decision maker, then the following Condition (2) is satisfied,
max
y∈∆(J)
sup
β∈M(J)
min
x∈∆(I)
inf
α∈M(I)
dC
(g(x,y) + g?(α,y) + g?(x, β)
1 + p?(α,y) + p?(x, β)
)
= 0 (2)
Only one player can quit. We consider two subclasses of quitting games in which only one of the players can
quit, that is: (a) either J ? = ∅ (i.e. only the decision maker can quit) or (b) I? = ∅ (i.e. only Nature can quit).
In this restrictive setting, our main result is that if J ? = ∅, Conditions (1) and (2) coincide with the Blackwell
condition, and we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for approachability:
C is approachable ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈ ∆(J),∃x ∈ ∆(I), g(x,y) ∈ C.
Consequently, in this class, a closed and convex set is either approachable or excludable.
However, the equivalence between Conditions (1) and (2) is not true if it is Nature that can quit, i.e., I? = ∅.
Anytime vs Fixed Horizon A set C ⊂ Rd is called anytime-approachable if the decision maker has a strategy
independent of the horizon T such that the distance of the expected average payoff to C decreases to 0. We prove
that if only nature can quit, i.e. I? = ∅, Condition (1) is necessary and sufficient for anytime approachability.
But if only the decision maker can quit, i.e. J ? = ∅, then there are convex sets which are approachable but not
anytime approachable (i.e. Condition (1) is not sufficient for anytime approachability). This illustrates that, unlike
standard approachability and regret minimization, the anytime version of a criterion might be very different than
its fixed horizon version in quitting games. Stated otherwise, the doubling trick does not work.
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